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This article sets out to critique India’s security discourse surrounding the “surgical 
strikes” of September 2016, using the theoretical framework provided by 
securitisation. It aims to answer two central questions: First, can securitisation theory 
provide fresh empirical insights on India’s conflict with Pakistan over Jammu and 
Kashmir that have been overlooked by more traditional approaches to security 
studies? Secondly, in what way can this case further our understanding of 
securitisation and thus contribute to the development of the theory? In this article, I 
have argued that, much like a two-act play, India’s securitisation of the Pakistani 
threat occurred in two distinct (speech) acts. The first illocutionary move preceded the 
extraordinary measure of Indian troops crossing the Line of Control separating 
Indian- and Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The second speech act 
followed this action and occurred when the Indian state uttered the words “surgical 
strikes.” This defies securitisation theory’s chronological structure, which posits that 
the speech act always precedes the implementation of an exceptional measure. 
Secondly, I suggest that the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on the subjective nature 
of security and on the normative preferability of de-securitisation offers valuable 
insights on the empirical stalemate that is the Kashmir conflict. 
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 Following a September 2016 militant attack on an army base in the town of Uri 
in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Indian officials made a series of 
statements that directly and implicitly blamed groups operating out of Pakistan, as 
well as the Pakistani state itself (Ahmad, Phillips, and Berlinger 2016; Nation 2016; 
Times of India 2016). Later the same month, India’s director general of military 
operations (DGMO), Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh, announced to the press that “the Indian 
Army [had] conducted surgical strikes” in Pakistani-administered J&K “[b]ased on 
receiving specific and credible inputs that some terrorist teams had positioned 
themselves at launch pads along [the] Line of Control to carry out infiltration and 
conduct terrorist strikes.” Ranbir Singh declared that the operation had caused 
“significant casualties . . . to the terrorists and those providing support to them” 
(Indian Express 2016b). 
 This article sets out to critique India’s security discourse surrounding the 
“surgical strikes,” using the theoretical framework provided by securitisation. It aims 
to answer two central questions: First, can securitisation theory provide fresh 
empirical insights on India’s conflict with Pakistan over J&K that have been 
overlooked by more traditional approaches to security studies? Secondly, in what way 
can this case further our understanding of securitisation and thus contribute to the 
development of the theory?  
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 In this article, I have argued that, much like a two-act play, India’s 
securitisation of the Pakistani threat occurred in two distinct (speech) acts. The first 
illocutionary move preceded the extraordinary measure of Indian troops crossing the 
Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian- and Pakistani-administered J&K, which the 
two countries agreed not to breach in the Simla Agreement of 1972 (Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs 1972). The second speech act followed this action and occurred 
when the Indian state uttered the words “surgical strikes.” This defies securitisation 
theory’s chronological structure, which posits that the speech act always precedes the 
implementation of an exceptional measure. It is remarkable that these two distinct 
speech acts were used to justify a single extraordinary action of crossing the LOC to 
conduct “surgical strikes.” There is little reason to believe this is a phenomenon that 
is limited to non-Western contexts, and in that sense the article does not claim to 
contribute to this special issue’s theoretical agenda of widening the theory to better 
explain phenomena in the non-West. However, it does claim to have uncovered an 
interesting case of securitisation that does not fit the theory’s linear pattern, through 
its application of the theory to an empirical case in the non-Western world. In this 
sense, the article widens securitisation theory by arguing for the possibility of a double 
speech act that both precedes and follows the extraordinary action—whether in the 
West or non-West. 
 Secondly, I suggest that the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on the subjective 
nature of security and on the normative preferability of de-securitisation offers 
important insights on the empirical stalemate that is the Kashmir conflict. 
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Securitisation theory reveals the subjective nature of India’s perception that Pakistan’s 
claim to J&K is an existential threat to India’s survival as a state and a nation. In 
praxeological terms, de-securitisation shows Indian policymakers that they could 
choose not to securitise the issue and to deal with it through political means instead. 
The insight about security being subjective is not limited to the securitisation 
approach; it is, rather, a more general understanding of security within critical 
security studies. However, securitisation theory takes this point further by arguing 
that if an issue can be securitised through discourse, it can, equally, be de-securitised 
through a shift in discourse. There is a general dearth of critical studies of security in 
South Asia—analyses of security dynamics in the region tend to be informed by realist 
approaches. This article contributes to the literature on South Asian security by 
applying a critical approach such as securitisation to the longstanding India-Pakistan 
conflict, and more specifically, by highlighting the value of securitisation theory’s 
emphasis on de-securitisation for policymaking on the Indian subcontinent. 
 The remainder of this article is organised into five sections. The first section 
outlines the contours of securitisation theory and the challenges scholars have 
encountered in attempting to apply the theory to cases outside the Western world. In 
the second section, I critically analyse the statements Indian government 
representatives made in the aftermath of the Uri attack, demonstrating how these 
speech acts represented securitising moves that sought to construct a threat emanating 
from Pakistan. The third section considers the Indian operation in Pakistani-
administered J&K, and reflects on whether the widespread use of the ambiguous term 
7 
 
“surgical strikes” constituted a second speech act. In the fourth section, I argue that 
the Copenhagen School’s normative preference for de-securitisation offers valuable 
empirical insights on the seemingly intractable conflict over J&K. Finally, a concluding 
section pulls together the key findings of the article. 
 
Securitisation Theory, Democratic Bias, and the World’s Largest Democracy 
 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 1) justify their development of the concept 
of securitisation based on the widening of security studies by critical scholars to 
include non-military threats. Although they are in basic agreement with this widening 
move, they postulate that there are “intellectual and political dangers in simply 
tacking the word security onto an ever wider range of issues.” 
 To address this problem, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 23-24) 
reconceptualise “security” as “the move that takes politics beyond the established 
rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above 
politics.” They posit that for something to count as a security issue, it has “to be staged 
as [an] existential threat[] to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby 
generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise 
bind” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 5). This process is what the Copenhagen 
School refers to as securitisation. 
 Thus, securitisation theory contains six key concepts:  
the securitizing actor (i.e. the agent who presents an issue as a threat through a 
securitizing move), the referent subject (i.e. the entity that is threatening), the 
referent object (i.e. the entity that is threatened), the audience (the agreement 
of which is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to the threat), the 
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context and the adoption of distinctive policies (“exceptional” or not) (Balzacq, 
Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 495). 
 
 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 22-23) put forward five sectors in which 
securitisation may take place. These include the military, the political, the economic, 
the societal and the environmental. They suggest that in the international context, 
“security is about survival,” and securitisation occurs “when an issue is presented as 
posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not 
necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)” (Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 21). Thus, at the international level of analysis, 
securitisation “means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important 
that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt 
with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 
1998, 29). 
 Several scholars have argued that securitisation theory contains a European 
bias (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 507; Vuori 2008, 65-66). Wilkinson (2007, 5), 
for instance, contends that the theory assumes “that European understandings of 
society and the state are universal.” Greenwood and Wæver (2013, 485-500) expand 
the concern about Eurocentrism to one of West-centrism; they apply the theory to 
Egypt in the context of the Arab Spring and find that the theory assumes a basic level 
of stability for there to be such a thing as normal politics. In Egypt during the Arab 
Spring, the whole situation was exceptional, leaving no room for normal politics. This, 
for Greenwood and Wæver (2013, 501), suggested a Western bias in the theory, 
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because, in their words, “Western societies no longer confront (nor de facto run their 
politics on real expectations of) this kind of ultra-political moment.” 
 Similarly, Holbraad and Pederson (2012, 193) take exception to securitisation 
theory’s distinction between “ordinary and special politics,” which, they argue, 
assumes a rule-based order and reveals the theory’s liberal ontological underpinnings. 
Holbraad and Pederson (2012, 168-94) clarify that their point is not that securitisation 
theory “applies best to liberal democracies (although this may be the case), but that it 
involves certain political ontological premises associated with liberalist thought,” 
which is problematic when studying non-Western contexts where the form of 
governance is non-liberal, such as their case study of Cuba. 
 Vuori’s (2008, 69) perspective contrasts with that of Holbraad and Pederson 
(2012), in that he points out “that all societies have ‘rules,’ [which] are products of 
historical and social contingencies.” He also differs from Holbraad and Pederson in 
his clear articulation of the democratic bias within securitisation theory, arguing that 
scholars have understood securitisation to be a way “of moving certain issues beyond 
the democratic process of government” (Vuori 2008, 66). Vuori’s (2008, 66-68) point is 
that securitisation does take place in non-democratic settings, because all 
governments—democratic or non-democratic—require some amount of political 
legitimacy to survive. 
 The question of securitisation theory’s success in explaining events in non-
democratic contexts is also addressed by Wilkinson (2007, 20), who postulates that 
there may be limits to free speech in such contexts, “especially for non-state actors,” 
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which renders securitisation theory’s linear construction and emphasis on the speech 
act problematic. Wilkinson (2007, 12) highlights the possibility that securitisation may 
take place through mediums other than speech, such as “words, images and actions.” 
In addition, she suggests that,  
Contrary to the linear dynamic described by securitization, starting with a 
securitizing actor who then constructs a referent object and threat narrative to 
be accepted or rejected, the process may in practice start at any point, with the 
component parts developing simultaneously and contributing to each other’s 
construction (Wilkinson 2007, 20). 
 
For Wilkinson (2007, 22), in fact, “‘sufficient action’ may replace or supplement the 
speech-act as the driving logic in the process of securitization.” 
 In the context of these conversations about securitisation theory’s European—
and, more broadly, Western—assumptions, and whether the theory can 
unproblematically explain events in non-Western, non-liberal and non-democratic 
countries, India presents an interesting case. As shown above, scholars who have 
questioned the Western assumptions of securitisation theory have tended to focus on 
what happens when the theory is applied to non-democratic or non-liberal settings in 
the non-West. India, however, constitutes a case of a non-Western democratic state. 
According to Mishra (2012, 33), India is a non-liberal democracy, while Mitra (2013, 
227) proposes that India has combined “western liberal democratic forms and non-
western cultures.” Thus, India provides an intriguing case for studying securitisation. 
In the next section, I will employ securitisation theory to explore how political and 
military actors in India securitised the threat emanating from Pakistan in the aftermath 
of the September 2016 attack in Uri. 
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Act One: The Uri Attack 
 As noted above, the process of securitisation requires six elements: a 
securitising actor, a referent subject, a referent object, an audience, a context, and the 
legitimisation of “emergency measures or other steps that would not have been 
possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, 
and necessity” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25). When the securitising actor 
frames the referent subject as an existential threat, this constitutes a securitising move. 
However, for this securitising move to turn into a successful securitisation, it needs to 
be accepted by the audience (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25). 
 In the military sector, the most common referent object is the state and, more 
implicitly, the nation (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 36). When the state is the 
referent object, the securitising actor is often also the state speaking “through its 
authorized representatives” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 42). In this section I 
will show how the Indian state, through government officials, sought to frame 
Pakistan and Pakistan-based militants—the referent subject—as an existential threat 
to the Indian state and nation by appealing to an audience consisting of the citizens of 
India. I do so by referring to official statements made after the attack in Uri, relying 
on the Indian news media, the Twitter accounts of government officials, and an Indian 
defence journal as primary sources. Following Jackson (2005, 7), I use bold typeface to 
emphasise significant words in the discourse of the Indian state. Additionally, I 
discuss how the securitising move took place in the context of a surge in violent unrest 
against Indian rule in the Kashmir valley, as well as exploring the role of the national 
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audience in accepting the securitising move. The emergency measures that were 
legitimised through this process of securitisation are dealt with in the subsequent 
section. 
 
Analysing the Indian Discourse on Uri 
 The attack on the military base in Uri took place on the morning of 18 
September; nineteen soldiers and all four militants were killed (Al Jazeera 2016; Safi 
2016; Scroll.in 2016b). The same day, President Pranab Mukherjee tweeted, “India will 
not be cowed down by such attacks, we will thwart the evil designs of terrorists and 
their backers” (Twitter post, September 18, 2016 [3:55 a.m.], accessed May 22, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/RashtrapatiBhvn/status/777461121137582080). Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi also took to Twitter to “strongly condemn the cowardly terror attack 
in Uri” and “assure the nation that those behind this despicable attack will not go 
unpunished” (Twitter post, September 18, 2016 [1:01 a.m.], accessed May 22, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/777417302912430080?lang=en). 
Rajnath Singh, the minister for home affairs, tweeted: “Pakistan is a terrorist 
state and it should be identified and isolated as such” (Twitter post, September 18, 
2016 [1:54 a.m.], accessed May 22, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/777430703726211072?lang=en). In a 
subsequent tweet, he added, “I am deeply disappointed with Pakistan’s continued 
and direct support to terrorism and terrorist groups” (Twitter post, September 18, 




Finance Minister Arun Jaitley promised that the “[p]erpetrators of Uri terror attack 
shall be punished” (Twitter post, September 18, 2016 [5:45 a.m.], accessed May 22, 
2017, https://twitter.com/arunjaitley/status/777488820195332096). Media reports also 
quoted Jaitley as declaring, “It is clear that our neighbour is using terror to create 
menace in our country” (Scroll.in 2016c). 
Also on 18 September, Ranbir Singh told the media that “[i]nitial reports 
indicate[d] that the slain terrorists belong[ed] to Jaish-e-Mohammed tanzeem,” 
adding that “the terrorists had some items with Pakistani markings.” He said he had 
“spoken to Pakistan DGMO and conveyed our serious concerns” (Indian Defence 
Review 2016).  
Then, on 26 September, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj used her 
speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as an opportunity “to ask—
who is behind this and who benefits from it? Terrorists do not own banks or 
weapons factories, so let us ask the real question: who finances these terrorists, who 
arms them and provides sanctuaries?” More directly, Swaraj declared: 
In our midst, there are nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that 
nurture it, peddle it, and export it. To shelter terrorists has become their calling 
card. We must identify these nations and hold them to account. These 
nations, in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and 
deliver their poisonous sermons of hate with impunity, are as culpable as the 
very terrorists they harbour. Such countries should have no place in the comity 
of nations. 
 
To alleviate any doubts as to which nation she was referring to, Swaraj went on to 
complain that Pakistan had responded to India’s friendly overtures with “Pathankot, 
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Bahadur Ali, and Uri,” and spoke about “Pakistan’s complicity in cross-border 
terror” aimed at “obtain[ing] the territory it covets . . . Jammu and Kashmir” (Indian 
Express 2016c). 
 Thus, representatives of the executive and military branches of the Indian 
government used a combination of speech and words to frame Pakistan-based 
militant groups and, by extension, the Pakistani state as a threat to the Indian state. 
The securitising actor was, thus, the Indian state, speaking through its authorised 
representatives. Mukherjee’s assertion that “India w[ould] not be cowed down by 
such attacks,” and Jaitley’s reference to the “menace in our country” suggest that the 
Indian state was also the referent object. Mukherjee referred to “the evil designs of 
terrorists,” and Ranbir Singh to “Jaish-e-Mohammed tanzeem,” indicating that the 
Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) militant group was being framed as the 
referent subject. However, the discourse extended the referent subject to the Pakistani 
state, as is evident in Mukherjee’s tweet about “terrorists and their backers,” Rajnath 
Singh’s comments about “Pakistan [being] a terrorist state” and “Pakistan’s 
continued and direct support to terrorism and terrorist groups,” Jaitley’s remark 
about “our neighbour,” and Ranbir Singh’s mention of “Pakistani markings.” 
Swaraj’s rhetoric at the UNGA more systematically constructed Pakistan as the 
referent subject, as demonstrated by her utterances about “nations that still speak the 
language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle it, and export it,” “nations in which UN 
declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their poisonous sermons 
of hate with impunity,” and “Pakistan’s complicity in cross-border terror.” 
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 Swaraj also drew a link between the attack in Uri and the dispute between 
Pakistan and India over J&K. Her statements about J&K allude to the violence in the 
Indian-administered Kashmir valley amidst which the 18 September militant attack 
took place. Amnesty International (2016) wrote on 12 September that at least seventy-
eight people had been killed in Indian-administered J&K in violent protests since the 
security forces on 8 July killed Burhan Wani of the Hizbul Mujahideen militant 
separatist group. The human-rights organisation observed that the “[s]ecurity forces 
[we]re using arbitrary and excessive force in response to protests in Jammu and 
Kashmir, violating international standards and worsening the human rights crisis in 
the state.” 
 As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 29) note, securitisation “is always a 
political choice.” By choosing to securitise the Uri attack in the manner in which they 
did, Indian state representatives swept the Kashmiri context within which the incident 
occurred under the carpet. Furthermore, by making the mental leap from blaming the 
JEM to blaming Pakistan, the Indian state officials denied agency to Kashmir-focused 
militant groups, which, according to Stern (2003, 108), have access to other sources of 
funding, and “are no longer beholden to a single sponsor[, which] has emboldened 
them to the degree that they are prepared publicly to threaten Pakistan’s leadership.” 
 
(De)constructing an Existential Threat 
 While the previous subsection established that the Indian state as a securitising 
actor constructed a threat to itself emanating from Pakistan and militant groups 
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operating from its territory, it is not clear that an existential threat was being portrayed. 
To comprehend the existential nature of the perceived threat, it is necessary to dig a 
little deeper, and to refer to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s (1998, 36) assertion that 
“[f]or a state, survival is about sovereignty, and for a nation it is about identity.” 
By assuming that it was another state, and not a non-state actor, that was the 
“real” perpetrator of the attack, the incident was framed as a violation of India’s 
sovereignty over Indian-administered J&K. Furthermore, as Bose (2003, 9) explains, 
the Indian nationalist discourse considers Kashmir to be “India’s atoot ang (integral 
part),” which signals that holding on to Kashmir has become a part of India’s national 
identity. At her UNGA speech, Swaraj repeated the Indian refrain “that Jammu and 
Kashmir is an integral part of India and will always remain so” (Indian Express 2016c). 
Additionally, Snedden (2013, 221) points out that the Kashmir dispute is partly about 
“competing and irreconcilable ideas of nationhood, respectively based around the 
predominance of secularism or religion.” His argument demonstrates why it is so 
important for India to maintain control of the Muslim-majority Kashmir region of 
J&K, which is where disgruntlement over the status quo is centred. Keeping Kashmir 
has something to do with India’s identity as a secular state, and its ideological 
competition with the two-nation theory that is Pakistan’s foundational doctrine, 
which insists that Muslims and Hindus comprise distinct nations (Ganguly 2015). 
In this way, the subtext of the Indian narrative following the Uri assault was 
that India’s sovereignty and identity were being threatened. This implied threat to the 
survival of the Indian state and nation in their current form was understood by the 
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intended audience of the Indian state’s speech act: the Indian people. It is to this 
audience that the next subsection turns. 
 
The Role of the Audience 
 Although Swaraj addressed her UNGA speech to the member states of the 
United Nations, that is, to the international society of states, the primary audience for 
India’s speech act was the citizens of India. This adheres to a common pattern 
observed by Vuori (2008, 72), who notes that in most of the literature on securitisation, 
it is “the citizens of a state” who are considered the audience for a securitising move. 
 The framework of securitisation theory predicates successful securitisation 
upon audience acceptance (Balzacq 2005, 173; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 
499; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25; Côté 2016, 542; Vuori 2008, 70). In this 
sense, securitisation is conceived of as an inter-subjective process negotiated between 
the securitising actor and the audience (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 499; 
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 26; Côté 2016, 541). However, several authors have 
discerned a tension between the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation of 
securitisation on the one hand as a speech act, or a self-referential practice by the 
securitising actor, and on the other hand as an inter-subjective process involving both 
the securitising actor and the audience (Balzacq 2005, 177; Balzacq, Léonard, and 
Ruzicka 2016, 501; Côté 2016, 542). It has been argued that although the Copenhagen 
School claims that the audience is essential to securitisation, the concept of the 
audience has been underdeveloped, the audience has effectively been ignored in the 
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securitisation framework, and the theory consequently leans towards an 
understanding of securitisation as a self-referential practice in which the illocutionary 
act is sufficient to produce securitisation (Balzacq 2005, 177; Côté 2016, 542). 
 The identification of this problem leads to a distinction between active and 
passive audiences. Côté (2016, 551) argues that while the theoretical literature on 
securitisation characterises “the audience as a passive receiver of security arguments,” 
in fact, “audiences are active participants in securitization processes with the potential 
to undertake independent actions that can produce tangible security effects.” Vuori 
(2008, 70) introduces the idea of “active passivity” on the part of the audience, 
suggesting that while elections are one way of determining the audience’s support for 
a securitising move, a lack of support can be demonstrated through protests, riots, 
revolts, coups, or non-participation. Audience inaction, on the other hand, indicates 
its acceptance of a securitisation. Balzacq (2005, 185) suggests that formal audience 
legitimation can be obtained through a vote in the national parliament or the United 
Nations Security Council, for example—although this contradicts the notion that 
securitisation conveys an urgency that allows “the normal bargaining processes of” 
politics to be transcended (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 4). 
 In the case of the Indian state’s securitisation of the threat from Pakistan, no 
parliamentary vote was held, but at the same time, there were no signs of dissent from 
the populace, even after the army announced its “surgical strikes.” Balzacq (2005, 186) 
points to the importance of “collective memory and the Zeitgeist condition” in 
determining “how a given community perceives and symbolizes urgency,” while 
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Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 60) contend that “the existence of a bitter history 
and memories of previous wars facilitate the process of securitization.” Seen in this 
light, the bitter history of the India-Pakistan relationship and the emotional charge of 
the issue for the Indian public is likely to have supported the audience’s acquiescence 
in the state’s securitisation of the Uri attack. Indeed, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) swept state-level elections held in February-March 2017 in Uttar Pradesh, India’s 
most populous state, in the lead-up to which BJP politicians flaunted the “surgical 
strikes” (Firstpost 2016; Hindu 2016a; Shukla 2016; Vivek 2017). This provides an 
indication of the Indian state’s success in obtaining the national audience’s acceptance 
of its securitising move, despite the difficulty of measuring audience legitimisation. 
 
Act Two: The Surgical Strikes 
 Following the Indian state’s speech acts of 18-26 September, which occurred in 
the context of the 18 September Uri attack and the general volatility of the Kashmir 
valley since July, the Indian DGMO announced on 29 September that,  
Based on receiving specific and credible inputs that some terrorist teams had 
positioned themselves at launch pads along Line of Control to carryout 
infiltration and conduct terrorist strikes inside Jammu and Kashmir and in 
various metros in other states, the Indian Army conducted surgical strikes at 
several of these launch pads to pre-empt infiltration by terrorists (Indian 
Express 2016b). 
 
 In this section, I argue that this reference to terrorist “launch pads,” imminent 
“terrorist strikes” and the Indian army’s “surgical strikes” constituted a second speech 
act that followed the extraordinary action of Indian troops crossing the LOC. First, 
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though, it is important to establish what is normal in the context of India, Pakistan and 
the LOC. 
 Pending the resolution of the dispute over J&K, the LOC, which runs through 
the state, serves as the de-facto border between Pakistan and India in J&K. Exchanges 
of fire between Pakistani and Indian soldiers stationed along the LOC occur regularly, 
and can be considered normal in this context. India also routinely accuses Pakistan of 
permitting militants to infiltrate into Indian-administered territory via the LOC. 
However, it is not normal for the national army of either side to breach the LOC, which 
both sides agreed to respect in the 1972 Simla Agreement, and a violation of which 
effectively constitutes an act of war (Indian Ministry of External Affairs 1972). Hence, 
the Indian army’s claim of having conducted “surgical strikes” across the LOC, inside 
Pakistani-administered J&K, qualifies as an extraordinary measure that deviates from 
the normal politics of the subcontinent. 
 Ranbir Singh’s statement on the “surgical strikes” announced that the Indian 
army had “recovered various stores including GPS and items that clearly indicate 
their origins in Pakistan.” The DGMO also stated that “captured terrorists hailing 
from Pakistan or Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have confessed to their training and 
arming in Pakistan or territory under its control” (Indian Express 2016b), although the 
Indian National Investigative Agency (NIA) eventually in February 2017 dropped 
charges against two schoolchildren from Pakistani-administered J&K who were 
arrested on 21 September on suspicion of having acted as guides for the four militants. 
The NIA concluded that the children had run away from home after arguing with 
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their parents about schoolwork and accidentally crossed the LOC, although the 
authorities had previously said that the children had confessed to working for the 
JEM. The confession was brought into question when the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) 
claimed responsibility for the attack, and the NIA decided that it was, indeed, the LET, 
and not the JEM, that was the perpetrator (Scroll.in 2016a; Swami 2017). 
 The second speech act, then, involved the same securitising actor—the Indian 
state speaking through its representative—and referent subject—Pakistan. The 
mention of a threat not only to “Jammu and Kashmir,” but also to “various metros in 
other states,” suggested that the referent object encompassed all the states of India, or 
the totality of the Indian state. That Ranbir Singh’s statement was addressed to the 
Indian press indicates that the audience, too, was still the Indian people.  
This second speech act was notable for two reasons. First, it followed the action, 
whereas securitisation theory assumes a linear progression from speech act to action. 
Secondly, the use of the phrase “surgical strikes” produced a special kind of speech 
act, as I will show below. 
“What is a Surgical Strike?” 
 In a fascinating article about the US administration’s securitisation of Iraq in 
2002-03 through the assertion that the Iraqi regime possessed “weapons of mass 
destruction,” Oren and Solomon (2015, 313) “seek to reinvigorate” the illocutionary 
aspect of securitisation theory by arguing that “the utterances of securitising actors 
[consist] not in arguments so much as in repetitive spouting of ambiguous phrases 
(WMD, rogue states, ethnic cleansing).” Oren and Solomon (2015, 313) “further 
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propose that audience acceptance consists not in persuasion so much as in joining the 
securitising actors in a ritualised chanting of the securitising phrase.” 
 The ambiguity of the phrase “surgical strikes” was highlighted by the response 
of Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) to the Indian claim. In a press 
release on 29 September, the ISPR declared: 
There has been no surgical strike by India, instead there had been cross LOC 
fire initiated and conducted by India which is existential phenomenon. . . . The 
notion of surgical strike linked to alleged terrorist bases is an illusion being 
deliberately generated by Indian to create false effects. This quest by Indian 
establishment to create media hype by rebranding cross border fire as surgical 
strike is fabrication of truth (Inter Services Public Relations 2016). 
 
 Meanwhile, Indian and Pakistani news outlets mulled over the meaning of the 
term (Aaj Tak 2016; Guruswamy 2016; InKhabar 2016; Rehman 2016; Roy 2016), 
revealing it to be what Oren and Solomon (2015, 322) refer to as “a securitising phrase 
(with ultimately contestable meaning).” Oren and Solomon (2015, 332) point out that 
many Americans had no idea what a weapon of mass destruction was before 2002 and 
“had barely heard the term.” Additionally, even a concerted effort to pin down its 
meaning would prove to be a challenge. As Oren and Solomon (2015, 324) put it, 
“Audience members cannot quite check the accuracy of the securitising phrases they 
hear because . . . these phrases are typically ambiguous (what exactly is a ‘rogue state’? 
a ‘weapon of mass destruction’? and new to most people (how many people were 
familiar with ‘ethnic cleansing’ before it became a stock phrase in the 1990s?)” 
 Despite its ambiguity, Guruswamy (2016) observed that “the term ‘surgical 
strikes’ has dominated prime-time debates, social media chatter and dinner-table 
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conversations.” Unwittingly, Guruswamy was echoing Oren and Solomon (2015, 324), 
who posit that 
[s]ecuritisation succeeds when the “mantras” repeated by securitising actors in 
speeches and news releases jump to the pages of the print media, skip into the 
wording of frequently-asked and widely-reported opinion poll questions, 
reverberate through talk shows, news broadcasts, and other electronic media 
programming, echo throughout the blogosphere, and, increasingly in recent 
years, flood the social media. Mediated by these media forms, the securitising 
phrase infiltrates and even infects everyday talk, including, for example, dinner 
party conversations, chatter around water coolers, and discussions in school 
and college classrooms. 
 
 The fact that India is a multilingual country where a multitude of languages 
are spoken could have potentially impeded the securitising effect of the English 
phrase “surgical strikes.” However, it is common for Indians to speak more than one 
language and to creatively combine languages in everyday parlance, and a scan 
through Hindi news sources suggests that the local-language news media adopted the 
English terminology of the “surgical strikes” (Aaj Tak 2016; InKhabar 2016; Ranjan 
2017). 
 Thus, to paraphrase Oren and Solomon (2015, 316), the collective incantation of 
the phrase “surgical strikes” by the Indian administration, media and public as a 
ritualistic choral chant served to securitise the Pakistani state after the exceptional 
measure of breaching the LOC had taken place. The Indian army’s depiction of 
terrorists at their “launch pads” on the verge of crossing over into Indian territory 
constructed a threat that retroactively justified the “surgical strikes,” even as the 
Pakistani state denied they had ever taken place. This leads to the question—did they 
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really take place? The next subsection attempts to solve what Hussain (2017) refers to 
as the “[m]ystery of the ‘surgical strike.’” 
 
The “Mystery of the ‘Surgical Strike’” 
 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 25) opine that securitisation does not 
require the implementation of an emergency measure—the legitimisation of such 
measures or other exceptional steps through discourse is sufficient. Even so, this 
article’s argument that the Indian state’s securitisation of Pakistan occurred in two 
steps—a speech act before as well as after the exceptional action—is based on the 
assumption that such an action actually occurred. Pakistan’s official denial of the 
surgical strikes, however, raises a doubt as to what really happened. This subsection 
is an attempt at solving the mystery, even if it is impossible to conclusively establish 
what occurred on the morning of 29 September. 
 I refer to three key news reports. The first is an India Today article that claims 
“exclusive details of the inside story behind the surgical strikes.” The article reports 
that twenty-five Indian commandos crossed the LOC in Dhruv Advanced Light 
Helicopters and dropped into “enemy territory.” The commandos reportedly crawled 
three kilometres into Pakistani-administered J&K, heading for seven terrorist “launch 
pads” in the “Bhimbar, Kel, Tattapani and Leepa areas.” The article goes on to describe 
how the Indian soldiers “completely destroyed” three of their targets, killing “at least 
50 terrorists” as well as two Pakistani soldiers (Negi 2016). 
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 In the second article, a New York Times journalist recounts how the Pakistani 
military flew a group of reporters into Bhimber district in Pakistani-administered J&K 
to verify whether any “surgical strikes” had taken place. The New York Times reporter 
spoke to a villager called Malik Rustom from Mandhole village, near which one of the 
militant bases the Indian army claims to have targeted is supposed to have been 
located. Rustom reportedly said that the Indian troops had not left their posts and 
crossed the LOC, while “[a] group of villagers standing nearby nodded in agreement” 
(Masood 2016). 
 The third report is by Ilyas Khan (2016), a BBC reporter who visited the LOC 
and spoke to local people and police officers in Pakistani-administered J&K. Ilyas 
Khan’s investigation suggested that what had occurred was a ground assault that 
targeted posts of the Pakistani military, with Indian soldiers crossing about a 
kilometre into Pakistani-administered territory. Although no commandos were 
airdropped, Indian troops reportedly destroyed a Pakistani army post in the 
Madarpur-Titrinot area of Poonch. They also blew up an army post and mosque near 
Mundakali village in the Leepa valley, as well as two more military bases further up 
the mountains. In addition, Ilyas Khan was told that the Indians had entered the 
Dudhnial area in the Neelum valley. While two Pakistani soldiers were killed, Ilyas 
Khan was unable to find much evidence of militant bases having been hit. He found 
that militant camps in Bhimber, Leepa and Neelum appeared intact, although “one or 
two damaged structures” in Dudhnial might possibly have been militant bases that 
were struck on 29 September. 
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 These divergent accounts suggest that, as Ilyas Khan (2016) puts it, “There is 
no conclusive evidence to prove either side’s claims—the truth probably lies 
somewhere in the middle.” However, Ilyas Khan’s account seems the most 
convincing, not least because Negi’s (2016) “inside story” is likely to have been 
obtained from sources within the Indian establishment, while Masood (2016) appears 
to have been flown into Bhimber in a Pakistani military helicopter, which suggests he 
may have been exposed to a selective rendering of the story. Ilyas Khan’s account also 
seems to tread the middle ground between Negi and Masood’s versions. 
 
Desecuritising the India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir 
 For Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 4-29), de-securitisation—“the shifting 
of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the 
political sphere”—is the ideal in the long run. Securitisation theory, with its 
understanding that security is subjectively determined by actors, and that securitising 
an issue or accepting a securitisation is a political choice, opens up the possibility for 
such a transformation from securitisation to normal politics (Buzan, Wæver, and de 
Wilde 1998, 29-31). 
 In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict over J&K, a shift from security politics 
to normal politics would involve engaging in a political dialogue over the issue with 
the aim of resolving it through “the normal bargaining processes of the political 
sphere” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 4). The Pakistani foreign secretary in 
August 2016 invited his Indian counterpart to talks on J&K, to which Indian Foreign 
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Secretary S. Jaishankar responded that J&K was “an integral part of India where 
Pakistan has no locus standi,” but that India was open to discussing “aspects related 
to cross-border terrorism [that] are central to the current situation in J&K” (Haidar 
and Bhattacharjee 2016; Hindu 2016b; Indian Express 2016c).  
In April 2017, in the context of continuing violent protests in the Kashmir valley 
since the July 2016 killing of Wani, Kashmiri politician Farooq Abdullah told an Indian 
journalist:  
The situation is quite bad, and don’t tell me Pakistan is not a party to this 
problem. Whether you like it or not, you have to talk to Pakistan. If you want 
to beat the threat of the terrorists, then you better start talking now. . . . You are 
losing Kashmir. You better wake up, and start thinking on not a military 
solution, but a political way (Udayakumar 2017). 
 
Later the same month, the Indian Supreme Court advised the central government to 
engage in a dialogue with the Kashmiri demonstrators; the administration replied that 
it “would come to the negotiation table only if the legally recognised stakeholders 
participate in the dialogue and not with the separatist elements who rake up the issue 
of accession or Azadi in Kashmir” (Indian Express 2017; Mahapatra 2017; NDTV 2017). 
 As discussed in a previous section, Pakistan’s claim to J&K is perceived by 
India as an existential threat to its sovereignty as a state and its identity as a nation. 
However, if an “issue becomes a security issue[ ]not necessarily because a real 
existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat,” then 
policymakers have the choice of presenting the issue differently, and thereby 
transforming the situation (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 24). If India were to 
negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir conflict through talks with Pakistan and 
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Kashmiris,1 even if this involves losing some territory, it would probably enhance 
India’s sense of security by radically defusing tensions in the subcontinent. 
 Despite the seemingly obvious advantages of actively pursuing peace, the key 
actors in the conflict continue to neurotically reproduce patterns of destructive 
behaviour. This substantiates Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s (1998, 70) claim that 
historical, geographical and political factors can combine to create a mutually 
reinforcing pattern of securitisation that is difficult to dislodge. 
 Browning and Joenniemi (2017) link the challenge posed by entrenched cases 
of securitisation to the concepts of self, identity and ontological security. They explain 
that most of the literature on ontological security assumes that international actors 
“prefer stability and certitude to change, [and] are therefore liable to reassert 
established patterns of behaviour, routines and identities, rather than embrace change 
precisely because of the perceived need and value of maintaining stable self-concepts” 
(Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 31-32). Thus, states may prefer that a conflictual 
relationship continue, “because the enduring conflict reaffirms a sense of certainty 
about the identity of both oneself and the other” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 34). 
 While this explanation seems to encapsulate the unending Pakistan-India 
conflict, Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 35) are clear that an actor needs to be able to 
sometimes deal with change and to adapt its identity, rather than neurotically holding 
                                                          
1 As Snedden (2013, 220) points out, the Kashmir valley is the only region of J&K where dissatisfaction 
with the status quo of being administered by India runs deep. In contrast, Jammu and Ladakh appear 




on to a conflictual but stable situation. The literature Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 
37) critique suggests that with long-running conflicts (such as Kashmir), the possibility 
of arriving at a rational resolution becomes diluted by the fact that the conflict has 
“come to frame the identities of the parties,” while “[r]esolution would . . . require 
identity transformation.” For conflict resolution, what is needed is “flexibility, a 
willingness to rethink both the identity of the self and the other,” which causes anxiety 
“about whether identities can remain stable, and therefore about what the future 
world will look like, what our identity will be in the absence of the enemy, what will 
we do, will we any longer be who we think we are.” 
 However, these arguments are problematic for Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 
38) because they naturalise securitisation. Like Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), 
Browning and Joenniemi (2017, 38) insist that there are always options other than 
securitisation. They suggest that securitisation can cause as much anxiety as de-
securitisation, because the initial process of securitisation marks a shift “from a former 
situation when identity was not securitized and was more open.” Securitisation 
“entails a movement of rigidifying, closing down and bordering,” while 
“desecuritizations may actually suggest the existence of a self possessing the reflexive 
ability to step back, employ alternative channels of articulation and opt for some other 
identity—abilities . . . that are actually precisely at the heart of ontological security” 
(Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 39). 
 In South Asian philosophical terms, Indian Sufi sheikh Hazrat Azad Rasool 
(2002, 35) points to the potential for positively transforming the self when he writes, 
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“When one has transformed the lower self (an-nafs an-ammārah), the beauty one 
perceives and the love one feels is comprehensive, energizing, and spiritually 
fulfilling.” Singers such as Pakistan’s Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (1989 and 1992) and 
Abida Parveen and Rahat Fateh Ali Khan (2014), have beautifully rendered Indian 
Sufi poet Amir Khusro’s “Chaap Tilak,” which celebrates the joyous possibilities in 
surrendering one’s identity. These examples demonstrate that the intellectual 
foundations for the conceptualisation of a self who possesses the ability to consciously 
choose a different identity already exist in the shared philosophical, cultural and 
spiritual traditions of India and Pakistan. 
 
Conclusion 
 This article makes two main contributions. On the theoretical side, it has shown 
that securitisation can sometimes occur through not one, but two speech acts. This was 
demonstrated by arguing that the Indian state securitised its traditional enemy, 
Pakistan, through a securitising discourse that preceded the implementation of the 
extraordinary measure of Indian soldiers crossing the LOC. This was then followed 
by a second speech act that both described and justified the exceptional action by once 
again constructing an existential threat. 
 At the empirical level of analysis, I have argued that if India’s perception of an 
existential threat emanating from Pakistan’s claim to J&K is understood as subjective, 
then Indian policymakers have the political choice of opting to pursue a path of de-
securitisation. I have suggested that moving the issue from the realm of security to the 
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political negotiating table would enhance rather than detract from India’s (and 
Pakistan’s) sense of security. 
 In addition to these two central claims, the article makes several observations 
that contribute to the literature on securitisation as well as the Pakistan-India conflict 
over Kashmir. First, it notes that Indian officials used a combination of speech and 
words (in the form of Twitter posts) to convey their securitising narrative to their 
audience, supporting Wilkinson’s (2007) point about the Copenhagen School’s 
overemphasis on speech. Secondly, it draws on Oren and Solomon (2015) to show that 
the words “surgical strikes,” through their vagueness, themselves constituted a 
speech act that involved the securitising actor and audience joining in the ritualistic 
chanting of the ambiguous phrase. By applying Oren and Solomon’s idea to a 
multilingual context, the article demonstrates that catchy phrases can be effectively 
deployed by securitising actors even in linguistically diverse non-Western contexts. 
Thirdly, the article suggests that the resistance of the Kashmir conflict to resolution is 
a result of the identities of the Indian and Pakistani states becoming dependent upon 
their conflictual relationship. Even so, I have argued, Browning and Joenniemi (2017) 
are right to highlight the potential actors possess to flexibly adapt their identities, and 
this is not a new idea for Indians and Pakistanis, as I have revealed through my 








Aaj Tak. 2016. “Sena ne kiya PoK par surgical strike, janein kya hai ye?” October 2. 
Accessed May 24, 2017. http://aajtak.intoday.in/education/story/what-is-surgical-
strike-indian-army-military-attack-pok-after-uri-attack-1-890248.html. 
 
Ahmad, Mukhtar, Rich Phillips, and Joshua Berlinger. 2016. “Soldiers Killed in Army 
Base Attack in Indian-Administered Kashmir.” CNN, September 19. Accessed May 2, 
2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/18/asia/india-kashmir-attack/. 
 
Al Jazeera. 2016. “More than 20 Dead in Attack on Army Base in Kashmir.” September 
18. Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/20-dead-attack-
army-base-kashmir-160918055803596.html. 
 
Amnesty International. 2016. Global Standards on Police Use of Force Violated in Kashmir. 




Balzacq, Thierry. 2005. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience 
and Context.” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2: 171-201. Accessed 
May 19, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960. 
 
———, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka. 2016. “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and 
Cases.” International Relations 30, no. 4: 494-531. Accessed May 18, 2017. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590. 
 
Bose, Sumantra. 2003. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Browning, Christopher S., and Pertti Joenniemi. 2017. “Ontological Security, Self-
Articulation and the Securitization of Identity.” Cooperation and Conflict 52, no. 1: 31-
47. Accessed May 18, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1177/0010836716653161. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Côté, Adam. 2016. “Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in 





Firstpost. 2016. “Posters in UP Lauding BJP for Surgical Strikes Show Everyone is 




Ganguly, Sumit. 2015. “Affirming the Two-Nation Theory.” Deccan Chronicle, January 
3. Accessed May 12, 2017. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/150103/commentary-
columnists/article/affirming-two-nation-theory. 
 
Greenwood, Maja Touzari, and Ole Wæver. 2013. “Copenhagen-Cairo on a Roundtrip: 
A Security Theory Meets the Revolution.” Security Dialogue 44, no. 5-6: 485-506. 
Accessed December 23, 2016. 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010613502573. 
 
Guruswamy, Mohan. 2016. “What a Surgical Strike Really is (and Why the Army 




Haidar, Suhasini, and Kallol Bhattacharjee. 2016. “India Willing to Talk to Pakistan on 




Hindu. 2016a. “BJP Banners across UP Laud ‘Surgical Strikes.’” October 5. Accessed 
May 12, 2017. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/BJP-banners-
across-U.P.-laud-%E2%80%98surgical-strikes%E2%80%99/article15425612.ece. 
 
———. 2016b. “Pakistan  Invites India for Talks on Kashmir.” August 15. Accessed 
May 25, 2017. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Pakistan-invites-India-for-
talks-on-Kashmir/article14571296.ece. 
 
Holbraad, Martin, and Morten Axel Pederson. 2012. “Revolutionary Securitization: 
An Anthropological Extension of Securitization Theory.” International Theory 4, no. 2: 






Hussain, Zahid. 2017. “Mystery of the ‘Surgical Strike.’” Dawn, January 13. Accessed 




Indian Defence Review. 2016. “Uri Terror Attack: Statement by DGMO to Media.” 




Indian Express. 2016a. “India Rejects Pakistan’s Invitation for Talks, Says Ready to 




———. 2016b. “Surgical Strikes: Full Text of Indian Army DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir 





———. 2016c. “Sushma Swaraj’s UNGA Speech: Here is the Full Text.” September 27. 
Accessed May 22, 2017. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-
india/sushma-swaraj-unga-speech-full-text-3051409/. 
 
———. 2017. “April 29, 9 am News Update: SC Tells Govt, Kashmir Protesters to 
Initiate Talks, Priyanka Gandhi Land Deal, North Korea Fires Ballistic Missile and 





Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 1972. Simla Agreement. India-Pakistan. July 2. 
Accessed May 12, 2017. http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972. 
 
InKhabar. 2016. “Kya hai surgical strike, kaise diya jata hai anjaam?” September 29. 
Accessed May 24, 2017. http://www.inkhabar.com/national/25351-know-what-
surgical-strike. 
 
Inter Services Public Relations. 2016. Press Release. PR-334/2016-ISPR, September 29. 
Accessed May 24, 2017. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=3483&search=1 (Pakistan). 
 
Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-




Khan, M. Ilyas. 2016. “India’s Surgical Strikes in Kashmir: Truth or Illusion?” BBC, 
October 23. Accessed May 25, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-
37702790. 
 
Khan, Nusrat Fateh Ali. 1989 and 1992. “Main Jagi Piya ke Sangh,” by Hazrat Amir 
Khusrau. Traditional Sufi Qawwalis Vol. 2. Recorded December 1989 and September 
1992. Sony Music, 1996. CD. 
 
Mahapatra, Dhananjay. 2017. “Won’t Talk with Separatists Who Demand ‘Azaadi’: 
Centre to SC about Dialogue on Kashmir Unrest.” Times of India, April 28. Accessed 




Masood, Salman. 2016. “In Kashmir, Pakistan Questions India’s ‘Surgical Strikes’ on 
Militants.” New York Times, October 1. Accessed May 25, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/world/asia/kashmir-pakistan-india.html?_r=0. 
 
Mishra, Atul. 2012. “India’s Non-Liberal Democracy and the Discourse of Democracy 
Promotion.” South Asian Survey 19, no. 1: 33-59. Accessed May 22, 2017. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971523114539584. 
 
Mitra, Subrata K. 2013. “How Exceptional is India’s Democracy? Path Dependence, 
Political Capital, and Context in South Asia.” India Review 12, no. 4 (November): 227-
44. Accessed May 22, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2013.846783. 
 
Nation. 2016. “Rajnath Calls Pakistan ‘Terrorist State’ in Scathing Attack.” September 
18. Accessed May 2, 2017. http://nation.com.pk/international/18-Sep-2016/rajnath-
calls-pakistan-terrorist-state-in-scathing-attack. 
 
NDTV. 2017. “No Talks with Separatists in Jammu and Kashmir, Centre Tells Supreme 
Court.” April 29. Accessed May 25, 2017. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-talks-
with-separatists-in-jammu-and-kashmir-centre-tells-supreme-court-1687394. 
Negi, Manjeet Singh. 2016. “Surgical Strikes in PoK: How Indian Para Commandos 




Oren, Ido, and Ty Solomon. 2015. “WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through 
Ritualised Incantation of Ambiguous Phrases.” Review of International Studies 41: 313-




Parveen, Abida, and Rahat Fateh Ali Khan. 2014. “Chaap Tilak,” by Hazrat Amir 




Ranjan, Rajeev. 2017. “Surgical strike ke baavjood Pak mein ab bhi sakriya hain 
aatankiyon ke kareeb 50 training camp.” NDTV India, May 3. Accessed May 24, 2017. 
https://khabar.ndtv.com/news/india/terror-camps-in-pakistan-still-active-1689230. 
 
Rasool, Shaykh al-Tariqat Hazrat Azad. 2002. Turning toward the Heart: Awakening to 
the Sufi Way. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae. 
 
Rehman, Atika. 2016. “What is a ‘Surgical Strike’?” Dawn, September 29. Accessed 
May 24, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1286893. 
 
Roy, Divyanshu Dutta. 2016. “What is a Surgical Strike? Military Experts Explain.” 
NDTV, September 29. Accessed May 24, 2017. http://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/what-is-a-surgical-strike-1468025. 
 
Safi, Michael. 2016. “Seventeen Indian Soldiers and Four Militants Killed in Kashmir 




Scroll.in. 2016a. “Lashkar-e-Taiba Claims Responsibility for Uri Attack through Poster 
on Social Media.” October 25. Accessed May 8, 2017. 
https://scroll.in/article/print/819920. 
 
———. 2016b. “Uri: Another Soldier Succumbs to Injuries, Toll from Militant Attack 
Rises to 19.” September 30. Accessed May 8, 2017. https://scroll.in/article/print/817848. 
 
———. 2016c. “Uri Attack: Initial Reports Indicate JeM Involvement, Says Military 
Operations Chief.” September 18. Accessed May 22, 2017. 
https://scroll.in/article/print/816848. 
 
Shukla, Ajai. 2016. “Army Mute as BJP Election Posters Feature Soldier, Surgical 
Strikes.” Wire, October 9. Accessed May 12, 2017. https://thewire.in/71973/army-silent-
surgical-strikes-bjp-election-posters/. 
 





Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
Times of India. 2016. “Uri Terror Attack: 17 Soldiers Killed, 19 Injured in Strike on Army 




Udayakumar, Ganesh Kumar Radha. 2017. “Farooq Abdullah: Wake up India, Talk to 




Vivek, T. R. 2017. “With Yogi Adityanath as CM of India’s Largest State, the BJP Has 




Vuori, Juha A. 2008. “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the 
Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders.” European 
Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1: 65-99. Accessed May 21, 2017. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087767. 
 
Wilkinson, Claire. 2007. “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is 
Securitization Theory Useable outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1: 5-25. 
Accessed December 16, 2016. 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010607075964. 
